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Abstract 
We examine how the enforceability of covenants not to compete (CNCs) affects employee 
mobility and wages of high-tech workers. We expect CNC enforceability to lengthen job spells 
and constrain mobility, but its impact on wages is ambiguous. Using a matched employer-
employee dataset covering the universe of jobs in thirty U.S states, we find that higher CNC 
enforceability is associated with longer job spells (fewer jobs over time), and a greater chance of 
leaving the state for technology workers. Consistent with a “lock-in” effect of CNCs, we find 
persistent wage-suppressing effects that last throughout a worker’s job and employment history. 
*
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1. Introduction 
Human capital accumulation by workers is a key source of productivity growth, both at 
the aggregate (e.g., Romer 1989) as well as at the firm-level (e.g., Bartel 1994). Workers 
accumulate human capital at their jobs through their own effort, and through training and related 
investments made by their employers. Because skills are often not entirely firm-specific (Becker 
1962; Lazear 2009), when employees can quit at will, employers facing the possibility of a 
trained worker leaving their employment might be discouraged from making investments in the 
worker’s human capital in the first place (Rajan and Zingales 2001). Employers might be 
especially discouraged from providing employees with valuable training or information if they 
are concerned that such investments will be used directly against them in case the employee 
leaves for a competitor.  
One of the policy measures to restore the incentive to make these investments is to allow 
employers to restrict their workers’ freedom to move to other firms through covenants not to 
compete (CNCs) (Callahan 1985; Sterk 1993), which prohibit employees from either joining 
competitors or starting a competing firm for a specified amount of time (typically between six 
months and two years (Gilson 1999)) and in a specified geographic region (Rubin and Shedd, 
1981; Posner, Triantis, and Triantis 2004). However, doing so has the potential to reduce the 
overall mobility of workers across firms.  
 Further, it has been argued that reducing barriers to worker mobility has a number of 
potential efficiency benefits from improved match quality and increased entrepreneurship, and 
spillover benefits from knowledge sharing (Gilson 1999). From an efficiency point of view, a 
priori, it is unclear if these potential welfare gains from the freedom to move are greater than the 
potential welfare gains from promoting firm investments in human capital through enforcement 
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of (mutually agreed-upon) contractual prohibitions on within-industry mobility. Not surprisingly, 
states have taken vastly different enforcement approaches, with some states banning CNCs 
outright and others enforcing them even when the employee is fired. In fact, CNC enforceability 
is a topic of ongoing, vigorous debate in state legislatures; eleven states have proposed CNC 
reform laws in the past year.1 Indeed, over the past few years, CNCs have also become a focus of 
attention for policymakers concerned about wage stagnation (Biden 2016), the decline in 
economic dynamism (Davis and Haltiwanger 2014), and spurring innovation (Zillman 2015).  
In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of real-world effects of CNC 
enforceability on workers using quarterly employment records for the universe of employees 
with initial earnings more than $35,000 (2008 dollars) in thirty U.S. states. Specifically, we 
examine how the variability in CNC enforceability is related to the rate and direction of worker 
mobility, and the time path of wages both within-jobs and across a worker’s career.2  
Interestingly, like the theoretical ambiguity in the overall welfare benefits of CNC 
enforceability, it is not theoretically clear that the freedom to move unambiguously benefits 
individual workers. Though both pro- and anti-enforcement arguments generally generate the 
same predictions with regard to the relationship between CNC enforceability and mobility—
workers stay longer and are redirected away from competitors—they differ in their predictions 
1 See https://faircompetitionlaw.com/the-changing-landscape-of-trade-secrets-laws-and-
noncompete-laws/. 
2 “Enforcement” refers to the act of enforcing a CNC by a firm or a court; “enforceability” refers 
to whether a CNC can withstand scrutiny in court.  
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with regards to the levels and time path of wages both within jobs and over a worker’s career.3 
As pro-enforcement advocates would argue, enforcing solves a holdup problem, providing firms 
with incentives to invest in the development of highly valuable information that would otherwise 
be at risk of expropriation (Rubin and Shedd 1981).4 Then, not enforcing CNCs may reduce such 
investments, eventually decreasing worker productivity and potentially worker wages as well. 
Indeed, Lavetti, Simon and White (2014) find wages to be higher among physicians who sign 
CNCs because such physicians tend to have a larger client base. In contrast, anti-enforcement 
advocates would argue that inherent inequities in bargaining power, such as the firm’s ability to 
delay introducing the CNC until after the worker has accepted the job, make it unlikely that 
workers will be able to properly negotiate for the mobility they give up (Arnow-Richman 2001, 
2006), which means they could be “locked in” by CNC enforcement in a low mobility-low wage 
equilibrium, both at the outset and throughout the job.5  
3 Under some conditions, low enforcement may curtail mobility (see model in the Theory 
Appendix). In particular, if human capital is firm-specific, and if workers invest significantly 
more in skills when they are less locked in, then in equilibrium, we may see higher levels of 
human capital and lower job-switching rates in low-enforceability regimes. 
4 There are also benefits from other possible concerns, such as the relationship between CNC 
enforceability and collusion (Mukherjee and Vasconcelos 2012) and appropriation from new 
entrants (Posner, Triantis, and Triantis 2004). 
5 Another concern highlighted by these scholars is that increased knowledge flows via worker 
mobility actually result in more innovation through the recombination of knowledge than when 
workers are restricted from leaving, as suggested by California’s ban on CNCs and the growth of 
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We test these contrasting hypotheses using data on the length of job spells, industry- and 
state-switching behavior, and the time path of wages within a job and across the employee’s 
career using rich employer-employee matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau. We utilize a 
pseudo difference-in-differences methodology by examining across-state differences in CNC 
enforceability effects on technology workers (“tech workers”) relative to the effects on non-
technology workers (“non-tech workers”). This approach, which addresses the limitation that 
variation in CNC enforceability is cross-sectional, rests on our presumption that workers in 
technology sectors are more likely to embody intellectual capital (e.g., as argued in Marx 2011), 
so that firms have a stronger incentive to utilize CNCs as a means for protecting intellectual 
property in technology sectors relative to others. Consistent with this presumption, Starr, 
Bishara, and Prescott (2016) document higher observed incidence of CNCs for tech workers, and 
a large literature in law and economics has focused on the effect of CNC enforceability on high-
technology workers (see review in Arnow-Richman 2001).6      
This pseudo difference-in-differences approach allows us to include state fixed effects, 
which controls for potential unobserved state level variables (so long as they impact mobility and 
wages in a similar way across sectors). Further, the richness of our data allows us to include 
Silicon Valley (Hyde 2003; Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer 2006; Lobel 2013; Gilson 1999; 
Samila and Sorenson 2011). 
6 To the extent that we find null effects, this could be because CNCs are equally strongly used in 
non-tech sectors, in which case our estimates may be biased towards zero. Another reason for 
our focus on technology workers is that mobility of these workers has been argued to be 
important sources of knowledge spillovers and a potential source of agglomeration economies 
(e.g., Gilson 1999, Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer 2006). 
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interacted “industry-job starting year-firm size-starting wage decile-starting age-sex” fixed 
effects, so that we compare workers within the same industry, cohort, age, and gender with 
similar initial wages and employed in similar sized firms, effectively controlling for a number of 
potential omitted variables that could be correlated (e.g., due to selection on correlated state-level 
variables by firms or individuals) with CNC enforceability.7 This allows us to control for many 
other determinants of mobility in a fine-grained, non-parametric way that past studies have not 
been able to. More broadly, by using large-scale, high-frequency data that covers the universe of 
tech workers in thirty states and by making the link between CNC enforceability and mobility 
explicit, our results on the length of job spells, increased propensity for cross-state mobility, and 
reduced within-industry mobility corroborate and significantly generalize the findings of Fallick, 
Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006) for tech workers. Our study also significantly generalizes the 
influential results on the mobility effects of CNC enforceability found in Marx, Strumsky, and 
Fleming (2009) and Marx, Singh, and Fleming (2015) for patent holders, and Garmaise (2011) 
for executives.  
We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in CNC enforceability increases the length 
of job-spells for workers in technology industries (“tech jobs”) by at least 1.5%, compared with 
the length of job-spells for workers in non-technology industries (“non-tech jobs”). Based on 
7 For instance, younger workers may be more likely to be in low-CNC jurisdictions (say because 
other amenities are correlated with low CNC—e.g., good weather in California), so that 
unconditional differences in mobility across enforceability jurisdictions may reflect differences 
in age-related mobility differences, rather than true differences induced by enforceability. Our 
fixed effects are able to non-parametrically condition out this and any such compositional 
differences to examine differences with a very closely matched set of workers.  
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this, a technology worker in the highest enforceability state (Florida) would have a 7.5% longer 
average length of tech job spells relative to technology workers of the same gender, starting 
cohort, and age group, in similar sized firms, with similar starting wages employed in the same 
industry in the lowest enforceability state (California), compared with the differences for a 
control group of non-tech workers. Our data also allows us to examine the effect of CNC 
enforceability on mobility over the job spell; the impact of CNC enforceability on the probability 
of a job spell exceeding a given spell length is initially low, but large, statistically significant, 
and monotonically increasing in job spell lengths from two to six years, and flat thereafter. This 
is suggestive of an increase of tech worker value to the firm (making such workers more targeted 
for mobility restriction) over the job-spells from years two to six, and flattening of worker value 
thereafter.  
We also find that CNC enforceability is related to the type and direction of worker 
movement in expected ways. In particular, we find that individuals whose first jobs are in the 
technology sector in higher enforceability states have fewer jobs within their first eight years but 
are more likely to move across states. Due to human capital investment decisions or location 
choice by firms, it could be expected that tech workers in high-enforceability states have more 
industry-specific skills. Consistent with this expectation, we find that individuals starting work in 
the tech sector in high-enforceability states are also less likely to switch industries, and more 
likely to move across states without switching industries. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to document these interesting empirical regularities.  
Beyond significantly generalizing prior results on mobility, the major contribution of this 
paper is in the treatment of wages. In contrast to existing work, which either examines cross-
sectional differences in wages (Starr 2016; Starr, Ganco, Campbell 2016), limited to executive 
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compensation (Garmaise 2011) or has no data on wages (Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming 2009; 
Marx, Singh, and Fleming 2015), we track the time path of wages across the job spell and across 
the worker’s career.  
Compared with their peers in low-enforceability states, we find no evidence that the 
reduced mobility of tech workers in high-enforceability states is offset by higher wage levels. In 
contrast, consistent with reduced bargaining power in high CNC regimes (as argued by Arnow-
Richman 2001, 2006), we find that tech workers, conditional on their initial wage, earn lower 
wages (between –0.5% and –0.7% for a one-standard-deviation increase in CNC enforceability) 
throughout their job spell in higher enforceability states. Our results show that at every phase of 
job tenure, conditional on their initial wage at a firm, tech workers in high-enforceability states 
earn less than their counterparts in lower enforceability states. In fact, we find that starting a job 
in a high-enforceability state results in persistently lower wages over the next eight years of the 
worker’s career. Together, our results strongly suggest that CNC enforceability is associated with 
a “job lock” similar to that discussed in Gruber and Madrian (1994) and reduced bargaining 
power for the average technical worker (as discussed in Arnow-Richman 2001, 2006). 
These baseline findings are robust to analyses using different econometric approaches 
and to checks using a variety of sub-samples and controls. Even within the tech sector, we expect 
workers with higher start-of-job-spell wages to have greater intellectual capital and hence be 
more closely targeted for CNC enforcement by firms, which affords a pseudo triple-difference 
approach to detecting effects of CNC enforceability. We tested and found a significant pseudo 
triple-difference effect in the expected direction; that is, higher initial-wage workers in tech 
sectors have significantly lower mobility and lower wages relative to lower initial-wage tech 
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workers in high-CNC-enforceability states, and that this effect is larger relative to similar 
differences for non-tech workers. 
We now turn to a theoretical discussion of how enforceability relates to mobility and 
worker earnings.  
2. Mobility and Wage Effects of CNC Enforceability 
We use a simple model of mobility and wage determination to understand how CNC 
enforceability affects the length of job spells and the pattern of wages. We briefly describe the 
model and underlying intuition here, leaving the details to the Theory Appendix. In our model, 
the economic value of a worker-firm relationship is given by θ, which reflects the worker’s 
human capital relevant to the firm. The worker searches for opportunities outside the firm, and 
receives a single offer with wage W0, from a uniform distribution [0, 1 + μ]. If the outside wage 
is greater than θ, the worker leaves. Otherwise, the worker negotiates with the firm and obtains a 
wage αθ + (1 – α)W0, where α is a parameter that reflects the bargaining of  the worker. Thus, in 
this model, worker mobility is determined by the probability of getting an offer above θ, which is 
determined by where θ is relative to the upper bound of outside offers 1 + μ. Average wage is a 
linear combination of outside wage offers and wages within the firm, conditional on staying. 
Enforceable CNCs drive a legal wedge between a departing employee and competing 
firms, and reduce the range of wage offers received by a worker.8 Therefore, increasing CNCs 
will decrease μ. In addition, enforceability also reduces the bargaining power of a worker within 
8 This can be thought of as a simplification of a longer process, where enforceability reduces the 
potential number of outside offers, which in turn reduces the maximum of those wage offers (for 
many common distributions of wage offers).  
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the firm, which affects the share of economic surplus that goes to the worker. That is, increasing 
enforceability decreases α. We refer to this as the “lock-in” effect of enforceability.  
When θ is exogenously determined (that is, individual or firm investments in human 
capital do not affect θ), increasing enforceability does not affect θ, but the maximum possible 
wage offer, 1 + μ, decreases. This decreases the probability of exit, thus decreasing worker 
mobility. Furthermore, because α decreases, average wages also decrease.  
However, when θ is affected by the level of investments made by the firm or worker, the 
effects are not uniformly unambiguous. Increasing CNC enforceability increases the firm’s 
investment and decreases the worker’s investments in human capital. In the case where human 
capital responds only to firm investment, higher CNC enforceability increases the probability 
that the worker stays but the effect on wages is ambiguous. This is because higher CNC 
enforceability increases the firm’s investment in θ, which increases the threshold wage for the 
worker to leave. Since the upper bound of outside offers (1 + μ) falls, the probability of leaving 
(and worker mobility) declines unambiguously. If higher enforceability does not affect the 
bargaining power significantly, then the increased human capital from higher firm investments 
implies higher wages for workers. However, if higher enforceability significantly reduces 
workers’ bargaining power, their wages may decline. This would be consistent with workers 
being “locked in.”  
In the case where human capital responds only to individual investment, both the 
mobility and wage effects of increasing enforceability are ambiguous. θ decreases due to 
decreased individual investment, but so does the upper bound of outside offers. Wages within the 
firm, conditional on staying, unambiguously decrease due to decreased worker bargaining power 
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and decreased worker investment, but average wage levels may not decrease if the probability of 
leaving and accepting an outside wage offer increases. 
 This simple framework illustrates that, ultimately, whether CNC enforceability decreases 
worker mobility and wages or not is an empirical question.  
3. Data 
3.1. Sample Construction 
We construct a job-level and a worker-level repeated cross-sectional dataset using the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) database at the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
LEHD is a composite linked employer-employee dataset comprising multiple state-level 
databases. There are two advantages to using the LEHD for this study. First, the LEHD provides 
employment history data for individual workers over a long horizon for a full spectrum of 
industries in the U.S. economy across a large number of states that vary in CNC enforceability 
levels. Second, the quarterly administrative data on all firms provides a clear measure of job 
transfer, mobility, and wage at a high-frequency level, largely free from selection issues that may 
arise in studies that use patenting or listed firm executive employment data.  
Linked employer-employee records of employment history are available for thirty states 
at the worker-firm-year-quarter level in the Employment History File (EHF) within the LEHD. 9 
From the employment history of each worker, we identify jobs at each of the firms where the 
worker worked (i.e., when there is a change in the firm identifier in the worker’s employment 
9 The thirty states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Montana, North Carolina, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.  
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history, we identify that as a job change). Because the firm identifiers of the EHF are within-state 
identifiers, we use the national-level firm identifier available in the Business Register Bridge 
(BRB) for defining the job. This ensures we do not wrongly capture within-firm, inter-state, or 
intra-state transfers as worker movements out of a firm. Because the link to the BRB is available 
only from 1991, our dataset for analysis covers the years 1991–2008. 
We keep left-censored workers, but drop any left-censored jobs from our dataset because 
not only we do not know the lengths of the latent spells for these jobs (and we can avoid the bias 
from stock sampling by dropping these jobs), but also we do not know the characteristics of 
these jobs at the beginning of the spell, which we use to construct our job-level fixed effects 
described below. To mitigate concerns with right censoring for the mobility analysis, we restrict 
our sample to the jobs whose spell started in 2000 or earlier for the analysis on the length of job 
spells.10 We also drop workers whose first-year annual income in the LEHD is less than $35,000 
in 2008 dollars, as these workers are not likely to have jobs that are knowledge intensive, and 
therefore are less likely to be affected by CNC enforceability (Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 2016). 
Secondary jobs (defined by the share of that job’s earnings to the worker’s total earnings) whose 
spell is continuing in parallel to another job for the same worker are also dropped.  
Finally, we obtain the NAICS industry classification information of the firms from the 
Employer Characteristics File of the LEHD, and biographic information such as sex, date of 
birth, and foreign-born status from the Individual Characteristics File of the LEHD.  
10 Duration model estimations are not computationally feasible alternatives for our analysis, 
because our identification strategy utilizes high dimensional fixed effects. 
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3.2. Key Outcomes of Interest 
Job-level mobility and earnings: For each job defined, we construct two dependent variables for 
examining the effect of CNC enforceability on a worker’s mobility. The first is the length of the 
job spell defined as the log number of quarters the worker was employed at the firm. The second 
is a set of dummy variables for the job spell surviving a given length of time: a dummy variable 
with value 1 if the job spell survives until the 4th quarter of its spell, a dummy variable with 
value 1 if the job spell survives until the 8th quarter of its spell, and so on. We examine the 
survival of job spells up to the 32nd quarter (or eight years) from the start of the job spell. Using 
these dependent variables not only circumvents the right censoring of spells but also provides 
richer information on how CNC enforceability affects the distribution of job spells.  
We examine the effect of CNC enforceability on wages, across job tenure by examining 
wages in various dimensions. Our primary measure is log wage at the 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarters 
of the job spell, CPI-adjusted to 2008 dollars. We also examine log cumulative wage at the 4th, 
8th, …, 32nd quarters of the job spell.  
Mobility and earnings over employment history: Beyond the effect of CNC enforceability on the 
job-level outcomes, we examine its effect on workers’ career outcomes across their employment 
history. In parallel to the analysis of job-level mobility and wages, we examine how CNC 
enforceability affects the cumulative number of jobs taken (in logs) and workers’ cumulative 
earnings (in logs) at the worker level. Further, we extend our analysis to the workers’ choice of 
switching states or industries to avoid or circumvent CNC enforceability, by examining the 
cumulative number of switches in states or switches in industries at the worker level (in logs). 
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We examine these outcomes across the 4th, 8th, …32nd quarters of workers’ employment 
history.11   
3.3. The CNC Enforceability Measure 
A commonly used data source for the measure of CNC enforceability is Malsberger’s 
(1996) series Covenants Not to Compete: A State by State Survey, which tracks the case law for 
each state along numerous dimensions of enforceability. Bishara (2011) and Garmaise (2011) 
each quantify these various dimensions of enforceability. We use the enforceability index 
developed in Starr (2016), which modifies the Bishara (2011) index by performing factor 
analysis to re-weight the seven dimensions of enforceability. The Starr-Bishara index has the 
advantage of removing the redundancy of the seven dimensions of enforceability and capturing a 
finer granularity of the way enforceability is construed along a spectrum of weak to strong 
enforceability. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix presents the enforceability index scores by 
state for 2009. Note that the enforceability index scores are normalized to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation of 1 in a sample where each state is given equal weight.  
4. Empirical Methodology 
We estimate the effect of CNC enforceability on high-tech workers’ mobility and wages 
across the worker’s job and career by exploiting the significant inter-state variation in the 2009 
enforceability index scores. Specifically, we estimate the differential effect on the jobs (and 
workers) that are in high-tech industries compared with the effect on other jobs (and workers). 
As discussed earlier, we choose high-tech workers as our treatment group because these workers 
are relatively more likely to embody intellectual capital (as discussed in the literature, e.g., Marx 
11 For left-censored workers, the 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarters of the worker’s employment history 
are measured starting from the first job that is not left censored.  
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2011) and hence more likely to be affected by CNC enforceability. Indeed, while Starr, Bishara, 
and Prescott (2016) report a national signing rate of 18%, the incidence rate for Computer, 
Mathematical, Engineering, and Architecture jobs is much higher, at 36%. Further, studies of 
CNC litigations show that technology workers are frequently involved in such litigations (LaVan 
2000) and a large literature in law and economics has focused on the effect of CNC 
enforceability on high technology workers (see review in Arnow-Richman 2001). 
We use the industry (NAICS) classification of the employer to create a dummy variable 
for the job being in “Technology Industries.” We use the definition of “Technology Industries” 
by Paytas and Berglund (2004), which classifies the NAICS industries into technology industries 
by employment of occupations that are science-and-engineering-intensive based on the 
occupation-NAICS employment concordance provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We 
define “Technology Industries” at the three-digit NAICS code level, and jobs in “Technology 
Industries” are hereafter referred to as “high-tech jobs.” Industries that are not “Technology 
Industries” are referred to as “Other Industries,” and jobs in “Other Industries” are referred to as 
“non-tech jobs” hereafter. 
In all of our analyses, we use rich fixed effects, based on worker and job characteristics at 
the time the job spell starts. Each joint fixed effect defines a group of jobs that are common in 
terms of their three-digit NAICS codes, starting year, firm size group, starting wage group, 
starting age group of the worker, and gender of the worker. Firm size is the maximum number of 
quarterly workers employed at the firm in the year when the job spell started, grouped in 
quartiles. Starting wage is defined by a categorical variable, with eleven categories along the 
distribution of starting wages of jobs with the same three-digit NAICS codes. Starting age is the 
worker’s age in the job’s first year in quartiles in the distribution of starting ages for all jobs.  
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Note that LEHD data does not contain detailed occupation or reliable education data for 
workers. To mitigate potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity on these characteristics, we 
use starting wages (defined as the second-quarter wage of each job) as a proxy for the initial 
level of general human capital of the worker, using a categorical variable defined within jobs 
with the same three-digit NAICS codes. That is, we presume to the extent that workers with the 
same age and gender starting at the same time in similar-sized firms in the same industry have 
different educational backgrounds or occupations, this should be reflected in the starting wage. 
Starting-year fixed effects are used to control for cohort-specific initial period shocks.  
We then estimate the differential effect of CNC enforceability on the outcome variable of 
high-tech jobs using Equation (1): 
 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ}𝑗𝑗 + Σ𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗                                                (1) 
where the subscripts 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑠𝑠 are for job and state, respectively. These semi-parametric 
regressions use fully saturated specifications, and the job/worker characteristics fixed effects 
discussed above absorb the dummy variables that are absent in Equation (1). 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 denotes the 
dependent variables discussed above. 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 is the 2009 CNC enforceability index measure of the 
state. 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ}𝑗𝑗 is 1 if the firm is in one of the “Technology Industries”. FEj denotes job/worker 
characteristics fixed effects.12 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 denotes whether the worker was foreign-born. We control for 
12 For the worker-level analysis on cumulative number of jobs taken, cumulative wages, and 
cumulative number of states (or industries), the CNC enforceability measure is that of the state in 
which the worker’s first job is located. Likewise, the job-level variables and the job-level fixed 
effects are replaced with those of the first job; in other words, they are the initial characteristics 
of the first job. 
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foreign-born status, as foreign-born employees are subject to visa-related employment eligibility 
constraints that may affect their mobility. 𝛴𝛴s denotes state fixed effects dummy variables.  
Our coefficient of interest is 𝛿𝛿, which estimates the differential effect of CNC 
enforceability for high-tech jobs compared with non-tech jobs. This implements a cross-sectional 
pseudo difference-in-differences design similar to prior studies that exploit cross-state variation 
in enforceability by using a pseudo control group within each state to net out potential 
confounding state-level variables (Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer 2006; Stuart and Sorenson 
2003; Samila and Sorenson 2011; Garmaise 2011; Starr 2016; Starr, Balasubramanian, and 
Sakakibara 2016).13 This approach allows us to control for potential bias from omitted state-level 
variables that could be correlated with CNC enforceability.  
In particular, focusing on the differential impact of CNC enforceability on  technology 
workers relative to other workers allows us to include state fixed effects, which fully control for 
(fixed) state-level unobservables such as state policies, economic characteristics, and 
demographic characteristics that could be correlated with CNC enforceability and also with 
outcome variables such as mobility and wages (and hence could be potential sources of 
significant bias), so long as these unobservables impact outcome variables in a similar way 
across sectors. The cost is that we identify only the differential effect on high-tech jobs relative 
to non-tech jobs, so that baseline effects on non-tech jobs get subsumed by the state fixed effects. 
13 Garmaise (2011) also analyzes three within-state changes during our time period, but only two 
such changes occurred within our thirty-state sample. Because public disclosure of results 




                                                          
Further, to the extent that non-tech jobs are also impacted by CNC enforceability, our estimates 
could be biased downward.  
We extend this further to a pseudo triple-differences approach, by focusing on a subgroup 
of workers who are likely to be more strongly targeted for CNC enforcement. In particular, jobs 
with higher starting wages are likely to be more knowledge intensive reflecting higher levels of 
human capital. These workers are therefore likely to develop greater appropriable intellectual 
capital, and are therefore more likely to be affected by CNC enforceability (Starr, Bishara, and 
Prescott 2016). Specifically, we use a dummy variable for “high-initial-wage jobs” for the 
starting wage of the job being above the 98th percentile in the distribution of starting wages of 
jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. We then examine the differential effect of 
CNC enforceability on high and low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs, using Equation (2): 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ}𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐼𝐼{𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼}𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ}𝑗𝑗                               +𝛽𝛽3𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝐼{𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼}𝑗𝑗 + Σ𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗                                                (2) 
where 𝐼𝐼{𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ_𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼}𝑗𝑗 denotes the dummy variable for the job being a high-initial-wage 
job. All other terms are as described for Equation (1) above.14  
Our first coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3, which is the estimator of the differential effect 
of CNC enforceability for high-initial-wage jobs compared with low-initial-wage jobs, within 
high-tech jobs. Our second coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1, which is a pseudo difference-in-
14 As discussed in Section 5.5, as an extension, we examine a specification that includes state-
industry (two-digit) fixed effects; this allows for identification of differential effects of CNC 
enforcement on high-initial-wage technology workers, even allowing for state-level omitted 
variables that could have differential impacts on outcomes (mobility and wages) across different 
industries, so long as the effects don’t vary across wage categories within an industry.   
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difference-in-differences (DDD) estimator of the differential CNC enforceability effect for high-
tech jobs relative to non-tech jobs, after differencing out common unobservables across high-
initial-wage jobs and low-initial-wage jobs. The third coefficient of interest is β1 + β2, which is 
the estimator of the differential effect of CNC enforceability for high-tech jobs compared with 
non-tech jobs, within high-initial-wage jobs. Throughout, standard errors are clustered at the 
state level to allow arbitrary correlation of the error terms within each state (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004). 
5. Results 
5.1. Mobility and Wage Across Job Tenure 
Table 1 presents the differential effect of CNC enforceability on mobility from estimating 
Equation (1). The column heads denote the dependent variables for each of the specifications. 
Table 1 shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in the enforceability score increases mean 
job spell duration by 1.5% (Col 9). This mean effect is driven by rightward shifts in the job spell 
distribution in higher enforceability states beginning in year 2 (Col 2). A one-standard-deviation 
increase in enforceability increases the probability that a job spell lasts at least eight years by 0.5 
percentage points (Col 8). Given that only 12.4% of all job spells last eight years, a one-
standard-deviation increase in enforceability increases the likelihood that the job lasts at least 
eight years by 4% (0.5/12.4).15  
To put these in context, assuming a uniform effect over the distribution of enforceability 
scores, if a previously non-enforcing state adopted the maximal enforceability policy (a 
difference of five standard deviations), these estimates suggest that mean job-spell length would 
15 Summary statistics for all dependent variables are presented in Online Appendix Table A1; the 
population mean for the dummy indicator of job spell surviving more than 32 quarters is 0.124.  
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rise by 7.5% (markedly similar to the 8% observed in Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming 2009) and 
the likelihood that jobs last at least eight years rises by 20%. A graphic illustration of the 
coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals in Table 1 is provided in Figure A2. The 
increase in the effect on mobility over the tenure profile is consistent with employees gaining 
more intellectual capital and hence being more strongly targeted by firms for CNC enforcement. 
Table 2 presents the differential effect of CNC enforceability on wages across job tenure 
using Equation (1). We observe a persistent wage suppressing effect. The differential effect 
ranges from 0.5% to 0.7% for high-tech jobs compared with non-tech jobs, suggesting that 
moving from a ban to maximal enforceability would reduce wages by 2.5% to 3.5% for the 
average technical worker. The coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals are plotted 
in Figure A3. Unlike the tenure profile for mobility, the wage effect is relatively flat so the wage 
penalty effect of CNC is similar in log difference terms over the job tenure. Overall, comparing 
the wage penalty profile in Figure A3 to the mobility profile in Figure A2, the results are 
consistent with a reduction in bargaining power starting early in the job tenure of tech workers. 
The different patterns are consistent with a stronger effect of enforceability on increases in 
relationship-specific value (in Case 2A, where firm investments matter) as job spells increase 
(hence, the decline in exit propensity), but reduced bargaining power offsets potential gains to 
the employee (hence, keep the wage penalty relatively flat).16      
Table 3 reports the differential effect of CNC enforceability on the mobility of high-
initial-wage jobs relative to low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3), the differential 
16 Alternatively, the wage patterns may reflect intertemporal payment arrangements; e.g., the 




                                                          
effect of tech versus non-tech within high-initial-wage jobs (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2), and the pseudo DDD 
effect (𝛽𝛽1) by estimating Equation (2). The dependent variables denoted in the column heads are 
the same as in Table 1. 
We observe results that are consistent with those in Table 1, for both the differential 
effect estimate of high-initial-wage jobs relative to low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs, 
the tech versus non-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs, and the pseudo DDD estimate. We 
find that among the high-tech jobs (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3), high-initial-wage jobs experience a higher 
likelihood of survival compared with low-initial-wage jobs throughout the job tenure by a 
magnitude ranging in 0.2% to 0.5%, and a longer expected job spell (by 1.4%) when 
enforceability scores increase by one standard deviation. Within high-initial-wage jobs, 
enforceability has a similar effect for high-tech jobs relative to non-tech jobs, resulting in 3.5% 
longer job spells. The large and significant pseudo DDD estimate (β1) shows that the effect of 
CNC enforceability on mobility is greatest when workers are in both high-tech industry and 
high-initial-wage jobs. The key estimates and the 95% confidence intervals are plotted in the 
Online Appendix Figures A4 to A6. The patterns suggest that the differential effect for high-
initial-wage tech workers relative to low-initial-wage tech workers (Figure A4) is relatively flat. 
Relative to high-initial-wage workers in non-tech sectors, however, high-initial-wage tech 
workers see a sharp increase in the effect on mobility over the initial few (Figure A5), consistent 
with these workers gaining access to appropriable capital only over a period of two to three 
years, so that their mobility is relatively less restricted very early in the job tenure. This relative 
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increase in the effect on mobility over the first few years of job tenure is then also seen in the 
triple difference profile in Figure A6.17    
Table 4 presents the estimated differential effect of CNC enforceability on wages across 
job tenure of high-initial-wage jobs relative to low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs, high-
tech jobs relative to non-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs, and the pseudo DDD effect. The 
dependent variables, the fixed effects, and the estimation samples are the same as those in Table 
2. As in Table 2, we observe a persistent wage suppressing effect in all of the relevant 
comparisons. Among the high-tech jobs, the differential effect between high-initial-wage jobs 
and low-initial-wage jobs is estimated to be in the range of 2.9% to 5.0% throughout job tenure. 
Among high-initial-wage jobs, enforceability is associated with a differential tech effect between 
1.5% in year 4 and 2.4% in year 8. The comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients indicates 
that whether the workers are in high-initial-wage jobs or not is the driving factor of the wage-
suppression effect. The coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential 
effects within high tech, within high-initial-wage jobs, and the pseudo DDD estimates are plotted 
in Online Appendix Figures A7, A8, and A9, respectively. All show a negative effect on wages 
that decreases over time. 
17 The inverted-U shape of the profile in Figure A6 suggests that high-initial-wage recruits in 
high-tech sectors see an increase in appropriable intellectual capital over the first few years, and 
then a depreciation of such capital over time, so that they may be most strongly targeted for 
mobility restriction by employers in the mid-range of the eight-year job span we analyze here. To 
the extent that the profile of the effect of enforceability on mobility reflects underlying “value” 
of the employee to the firm, this is reminiscent of the value profile discussed in Lazear and Gibbs 
(2014, 82–85).    
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Next, in Tables 5 and 6, we examine the differential effect of CNC enforceability on 
payouts to workers across job tenure using alternative measures of compensation: cumulative 
wage and wage growth. We measure cumulative wage as the log of cumulative wage at 4th, 8th, 
…, 32nd quarter of the job spell since the job spell started. We measure wage growth as the 
difference between the log of quarterly wages at 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarters of the job spell and 
the log of initial wage of the job. Table 5 and Table 6 repeat Table 2 and Table 4, respectively, 
except that the alternative measures of wage are used, instead of the wage in levels.  
Table 5 shows that the differential effect of CNC enforceability on cumulative wage 
gradually increases over job tenure, and that the differential effect on wage growth displays a U-
shaped pattern. To provide context for the coefficient estimates, the results in Panel A suggest 
that if a non-enforcing state adopted the most extreme enforcement policies, cumulative earnings 
eight years into a job would be roughly 5% lower for the average tech worker relative to a non-
tech worker. In Table 6, columns 1 through 4 show that the estimates of the differential effect on 
cumulative wage for high-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs, the differential effect between 
high-tech and non-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs, and the pseudo DDD estimates on 
cumulative wages increase gradually over job tenure. The estimated effects on wage growth are 
presented in columns 5 through 8, which also indicates that the impact gradually increases as the 
job spell becomes longer, for the differential effect for high-initial-wage jobs within high-tech 
jobs, for the differential effect for high-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs, and for the 
pseudo DDD estimates. These results are consistent with the wage estimates reported in Table 4. 
Together, the results in this section show consistent patterns that CNC enforceability is 
associated with longer job-spells, and with lower wages throughout these job spells. 
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5.2. Career Outcomes Across Employment History 
So far, we have examined how CNC enforceability affects mobility and wage at the job-
level. In this subsection, we examine the mobility and earnings outcomes at the worker-level 
across the worker’s employment history.18  
We estimate Equation (1) across workers’ employment history, using the cumulative 
number of jobs each worker has taken to examine the differential effect on mobility, and using 
the cumulative earnings of the worker to examine the differential effect on earnings. These 
dependent variables are examined at the 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarters since the worker started his 
or her employment history. All right-hand-side variables, including the high-tech dummy, the 
CNC enforceability score, and fixed effects, are those of the worker’s first job in the dataset. 
Thus, we estimate how outcomes over the career of a worker are different depending on whether 
he or she started in a high-CNC-enforceability state relative to a similar age-gender worker with 
similar starting wage in a similar sized firm in the same industry starting his or her first job in the 
same year in a low-enforceability state.19 
18 Note that because the LEHD covers only thirty states, examining worker-level outcomes 
(unlike job-level outcomes) potentially carries measurement error due to movement of workers 
into non-covered states, which may attenuate our estimated coefficients. See Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
for some evidence on the lack of correlation between the missing states and enforceability.  
19 We do not estimate the enforceability effect using Equation (2) for the worker-level outcomes, 
as the high initial wage dummy variable is defined by the worker’s first job that appears in the 
dataset, and therefore is correlated with age for the worker-level data. Hence, estimation of 
Equation (2) at the worker-level would yield results largely driven by workers who enter the 
LEHD data as old workers. 
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Table 7 reports the estimation results. For both mobility (Panel A) and earnings (Panel 
B), we observe persistent differential effects of CNC enforceability across employment history, 
similar to the effects on job-level outcomes. The mobility-constraining effect is gradually 
increasing across employment history, such that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
enforceability is associated with a 2.1% decrease in the number of jobs after eight years, and we 
find a gradually increasing and then decreasing wage-suppressing effect across employment 
history. 
One notable distinction between the cumulative earnings regressions at the career level 
(Table 7) versus at the job level (Table 5) is that the latter are conditional on the employee 
staying in the same job until the tenure under consideration (e.g., the end of quarter 24 analysis 
in Table 5 is conditional on workers staying on until quarter 24). The mobility results (Tables 1 
and 3) suggest that high-tech workers have longer job spells than non-tech workers. Then the 
estimated effects for the job-level wage regressions could be impacted by a composition effect, 
with the direction of the effect depending on whether the workers that quit in low-enforceability 
states would have had higher or lower earnings if they had stayed on (counterfactual) than the 
average for survivors. To the extent that the more productive workers are more likely to find 
outside opportunities, the job-level analysis in Table 5 could be biased toward zero. Indeed, the 
larger magnitudes of the effects in Panel B of Table 7 compared with those in Panel A of Table 5 
suggests this to be the case. 
5.3 State- and Industry-Switching Behavior Across Employment History 
If variation in CNC enforceability were indeed material as our previous results suggest, 
one way to circumvent CNC enforceability would be to transfer to jobs outside the geographic 
scope of the CNC (e.g., the state) or to jobs in other industries. In this subsection, we examine 
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the total number of state switches, industry switches, and state but not industry switches across 
the workers’ employment history. The analysis is conducted at the worker-level, similar to the 
analysis in Section 5.2, and we use the same specifications as those in Table 5, except we replace 
the dependent variables with log (1 + cumulative number of state switches), log (1 + cumulative 
number of industry switches), and log (1 + cumulative number of state-but-not-industry-
switches). We define state and industry switches by changes in state and the three-digit NAICS 
code of the worker’s employer, respectively.  
In Table 8, we observe a greater frequency of state switches for high-tech workers with 
initial employment in a high-enforceability jurisdiction, compared with non-tech workers (Panel 
A). By contrast, greater enforceability is associated with a negative differential effect on the 
number of industry switches for workers in high-tech industries across their employment history 
(Panel B). Panel C shows that what is driving these contrasting results is that greater 
enforceability is associated with workers switching states but not industries.20  
20 We also examined how CNC enforceability affects the worker’s decision to switch state (or 
industry) at the point of job transition. For this analysis, we estimate Equation (1) having 
outcome variables as the binary choice of switching state (or industry). Each observation in the 
estimation sample is the worker-job-year-quarter observation at the quarter of job transition. 
Thus the regressions estimate the differential effect of CNC enforceability on the probability of 
switching state (or industry), conditioning on job transition, and controlling for the job 
characteristics of the pre-transition job. The results, reported in Online Appendix Table A5, show 
that workers in high-tech industries are more likely to switch state but not industry, and they are 
less likely to switch industry but not state, at job transitions in high-CNC-enforceability states. 
This set of results is consistent with the results in Table 8.  
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These results suggest that while tech workers in high-enforceability states are more likely 
to switch states to avoid enforcement, they appear to have greater industry-specific capital, so 
they are more likely to stay within the industry when they change jobs. This is consistent with 
greater investment in industry-specific human capital (or endogenous location of activities 
requiring industry-specific human capital) by firms in high-CNC locations (Marx 2011; Starr, 
Ganco, and Campbell 2016). Taken together with the baseline results of the significantly lower 
frequency of job switches by tech workers in high-enforceability jurisdictions, these results 
suggest that CNC enforceability places noticeable constraints on the frequency and direction of 
worker mobility across jobs.  
5.4. Unemployment or “Missing” Spells 
While the above specifications consider movements of workers across states and 
industries, workers may also become unemployed as a result of CNC enforceability. For 
example, if an employee leaves for a competitor, the competitor can subsequently be sued by the 
employee’s former employer, and the competitor could decide against hiring the employee 
(Viswanatha 2016). We use Equation (1) with the dependent variable as the log number of 
quarters between observed jobs in the LEHD. Such “missing” spells in the data may be a result 
of either unemployment or movement into a non-LEHD state. The dummy variable for high-tech 
jobs is that of the job before the missing spell, and the CNC enforceability score is similarly 
applied to the job before the missing spell. The estimation sample consists of all missing spells 
between non-continuous job spells. Online Appendix Table A6 reports the estimation results, 
where we observe small negative but insignificant effects. That is, we do not find any evidence 
for CNC enforceability being related to an increase in unemployment or “missing” spells. 
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5.5. Robustness Checks 
We perform several checks to assess the robustness of our results.  
Local labor market thickness: First, we redo our main analysis by controlling for two potentially 
confounding effects: local labor market thickness and industry-specific policies within each state. 
In particular, one might be concerned that unobserved local labor market thickness may be 
(incidentally) negatively correlated with enforceability, but also correlated with greater wages 
and mobility (as thicker markets could imply greater competition among labor-demanding 
firms). In the Online Appendix Table A2, we repeat our main analysis of within-job mobility and 
wages controlling for labor market thickness proxied using total employment in state/three-digit 
NAICS code/year (in logs). The results are remarkably similar to the baseline results.  
Controlling for state-industry effects in pseudo triple-difference analysis: A related concern is 
that states may adopt industry-specific policies or otherwise treat specific industries differently. 
For example, if the technology sector has differences in characteristics across states in ways 
correlated with CNC enforceability, it could bias estimates from Equations (1) or (2). To account 
for this possibility, as discussed earlier, we further saturate the specification examining 
differential effects on high-initial-wage tech workers (Equation 2) with state-industry fixed 
effects. The results, presented in Online Appendix Tables A3 and A4, confirm that the 
differential effects of CNC on high-initial-wage workers observed in the baseline results (Tables 
3 and 4) are not spurious artefacts of variation in industry-specific policies correlated with CNC 
enforceability across states. 
Using CNC ranks instead of raw scores: Another potential concern is that California’s large 
economy and near-complete CNC non-enforceability (an outlier among the CNC scores used in 
baseline analysis) could be inordinately influencing the results. We therefore repeat our analyses 
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in Section 5.1, using ranks of the 2009 CNC enforceability index scores, which is free from 
extreme values by construction. The 2009 CNC enforceability index score ranks are assigned 
integer values of 1 to 50 and are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across the 
fifty state values. Larger values correspond to stronger CNC enforceability and smaller values 
correspond to weaker CNC enforceability. In results presented in the Online Appendix (Table A7 
Panels A and B which repeat Table 1 and Table 2, and Table A8 which repeats Tables 3 and 
Table 4), we find that estimates using CNC ranks are very similar to those using CNC scores in 
terms of statistical significance and signs, and that the magnitudes are larger.  
Balance of enforceability measures across missing and available states:  Because the LEHD data 
we had access to does not cover all fifty US states, there could be a bias as a result of workers’ 
relocations to missing states. For example, when a worker is transferred to an establishment of 
the same firm that is located in a non-LEHD state, we lose track of the worker, potentially 
yielding a right-censoring in the spell measure. If firms relocate workers from low-enforceability 
states to high-enforceability states to protect their knowledge, and if the missing states have 
higher levels of CNC enforceability, there would be a positive bias in the estimated effect. 
However, a t-test for difference in the enforceability index scores between the states included in 
the LEHD and the states not included in the LEHD yield a p-value of 0.83, suggesting there is no 
significant difference in mean CNC enforceability scores across states in and out of the LEHD 
sample, which alleviates such a concern. 
Robustness of job spell analysis to using alternative samples: Finally, due to right-censoring, we 
restricted the sample to jobs that started in the year 2000 or earlier for our analysis of job spell 
lengths. In an unreported analysis, we find that the results for the log of job spells analysis are 
robust to the sample of non-right censored jobs that started in the year 2000 or earlier. We also 
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repeat columns (1)-(8) of Table 1 and Table 3 on the sample of jobs that started in year 2000 or 
earlier, and find that the results are robust. The estimation results are available upon request. 
6. Discussion  
 This study uses matched employer-employee data to examine how CNC enforceability 
affects the rate and direction of employee mobility and the time path of wages both within a job 
and across the employee’s career. Using a sample-splitting-based pseudo difference-in-
differences approach that employs fine-grained job-, individual-characteristics, and state fixed 
effects, we compare job spells (and wages) in “High Technology” industries with those in “Other 
Industries.” We find that stricter CNC enforceability is associated with longer job spells, a 
greater likelihood of leaving the state, and a reduced propensity for cross-industry movement. 
Importantly, we also find that compared with their peers in low-enforceability states, workers in 
states with high enforceability receive reduced wages and exhibit a lower wage growth 
throughout a given job as well as over their career. 
 Our finding of longer job spells, which is consistent with predictions generated by our 
model (see Theory Appendix) under most scenarios, is also consistent with prior studies of CNC 
enforceability and mobility such as Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009), Marx, Singh, and 
Fleming (2015), and Garmaise (2011). The two former studies find that inventor mobility was 
reduced and redirected out of state following Michigan’s reversal of its policy not to enforce 
CNCs. Based on within-state changes in enforceability, Garmaise (2011) finds reduced intra-
industry mobility among top executives. Relative to these studies, our examination of job spells 
covers a significantly larger and less-selective sample that tracks mobility with greater accuracy.  
 Further, our findings fill two important gaps related to (i) joint state-industry switching 
behavior and (ii) variations in the effect of CNC enforceability over job tenure. Regarding 
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switching, we find that the increased propensity to move across states but the decreased 
propensity to switch across industries is explained primarily by individuals who leave the state 
but stay in the same industry. These results are consistent with greater investment in industry-
specific human capital (or endogenous location of activities requiring industry-specific human 
capital) by firms in high-enforceability locations (Marx 2011; Starr, Ganco, and Campbell 2016).  
 Along the temporal dimension, we find that the impact of CNC enforceability is lowest at 
short tenures, but rises at longer tenures. Table 1 shows that the enforceability-related increase in 
survival probability of a job spell at 4 quarters is -0.02 percentage points, far less than at 24 
quarters (0.57 percentage points). The pseudo-DDD coefficients in Table 3 shows a similar 
pattern, consistent with CNC being enforced only after workers gain or learn significant 
appropriable intellectual capital, indicating that CNC enforceability has a smaller effect early in 
the job tenure.21  The higher impact at mid-tenure is consistent with Lazear and Gibbs (2014, 82–
85), who suggest the value of a worker to a firm is highest for mid-career workers, making it 
more likely that firms enforce CNCs on such workers. 
 Lower mobility alone does not imply a negative effect on workers. Workers may trade 
off mobility in return for higher wages resulting from increased firm investments in their human 
capital. For instance, Lavetti, Simon, and White (2014) find that physicians who sign CNCs have 
higher earnings and earnings growth. In contrast, we find that stricter CNC enforceability is 
associated with wage-suppressing effects, both one year into the job and throughout the 
employee’s tenure. In this respect, our results are similar to those in Garmaise (2011) and Starr, 
21 Further, in a Jovanovic-type learning/matching model, initial separations may be a signal of 
lack of fit between the worker and the firm, and such separations may in fact be mutually 
beneficial and unrestricted by the firm, even when CNC is enforceable. 
31 
 
                                                          
Ganco, and Campbell (2016). For example, compared with low-initial-wage jobs within tech 
industries, a one-standard-deviation increase in enforceability is associated with a 4% lower 
average wage after 28 quarters in high-initial-wage tech jobs (Table 4, column 7). The 
cumulative effect of this wage suppression over a seven-year period is 4.4% lower cumulative 
earnings, based on the coefficients in Table 6. A related possibility is that wages at the beginning 
of a job (which get subsumed in the starting wage fixed effects in our specifications) are higher 
in high-enforceability states, so workers in such states do not suffer any net wage losses over the 
entire job spell. However, we do not find any supporting evidence for this line of argument. 
Rather, subject to the caveat that data on detailed occupational characteristics is unavailable, we 
find that CNC enforceability is associated with significantly lower initial wages (Online 
Appendix Table A9).  
 Our last finding regarding the effects of CNC enforceability over the career of the 
employee suggests that simply starting a job in a higher enforceability state—regardless of 
whether the individual eventually leaves that state—is associated with reduced earnings up to 
eight years later. These findings highlight the potential that the initial legal conditions of 
employment have persistent effects on future earnings, similar to how entering the job market in 
a recession hurts those who are slow to move to better jobs (Oreopoulus, von Wachter, and Heisz 
2012). Indeed, the mechanism highlighted in Oreopoulus, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) is the 
rate at which workers move to better jobs, which is closely related to the role that CNC 
enforceability plays as a within-industry mobility friction. 
The theoretical model (Theory Appendix) shows that our empirical findings are plausible 
under a number of scenarios. The model clarifies that our results do not necessarily imply a 
stronger role for firm investments in creating firm-worker relationship value in tech industries. In 
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particular, our results do not rule out relationship capital being exogenous, or individual 
investments being more important. Lower exit rate and lower wages in high-enforceability states 
could be accompanied by lower knowledge capital resulting from lower individual investment, 
with firms gaining from obtaining a larger share of the smaller relationship value.22 
 Taking our results together, it appears unambiguous that CNC enforceability lowers 
worker welfare, consistent with CNC enforceability reducing workers’ bargaining power relative 
to the firm, and “locking” them into their jobs, as argued by Arnow-Richman (2001, 2006), and 
consistent with the lack of negotiation over CNCs observed in Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 
(2016). To the extent that lower wages over workers’ careers reflects decline in match quality 
between workers and firms, our results suggest that allocative efficiency is lower when there is 
higher CNC enforceability. Further, if mobility generates knowledge spillover effects, as argued 
in the literature (Gilson 1999), then potential gains from increased firm investments in human 
capital (if any) have to be significantly high to offset these negative welfare effects.  
 We conclude with a brief discussion of future avenues for research. To keep the study 
focused, we did not examine any inter-industry heterogeneity. There may be industries where 
high enforceability benefits workers (e.g., as Lavetti, Simon, and White 2014 find among 
physicians). It would be interesting to explore this heterogeneity, to shed light on industry 
characteristics that moderate the impact of CNC enforceability.  Also, as for most other studies, 
22 We note that the survey evidence in Starr (2016) does not find evidence for lower worker 
training investments in high-enforceability states. If enforceability does incentivize firm 
investments and increase relationship productivity, then our findings suggest a strong negative 
impact of CNC enforceability on worker bargaining power (see the discussion of Case 2A in the 
Theory Appendix).    
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we cannot identify in the data who is and who is not bound by a CNC. Thus, we must aggregate 
the effect of CNC enforceability on those who do and do not sign, which likely attenuates the 
overall results and makes it difficult to isolate the exact mechanisms underlying the observed 
relationships. Disentangling the extent to which these effects are driven by those who sign and 
those who do not sign is an important avenue for future research.  
 For policymakers, the lack of time-series data on the actual use of CNCs  means we 
cannot assess the role of  potential increases in CNC usage over time in (at least partially) 
explaining the decline in U.S. labor market dynamism  and wage stagnation (Davis and 
Haltiwanger 2014, Hyatt and Spletzer 2013; Biden 2016; Council of Economic Advisers 2016). 
Assessing this possibility with data on who signs CNCs is another avenue for future research. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that reductions in CNC enforceability could be one effective 
lever available to lawmakers for increasing labor market dynamism. 
 Our findings also highlight a potential similarity between labor market collusion and the 
enforceability of CNCs. The “gentleman’s agreements” signed by Apple, Google, and many 
other tech companies in California to not recruit each other’s employees served to reduce both 
wage competition and mobility between competitors (Helft 2009).23 Mukherjee and Vasconcelos 
(2012) model these agreements as alternate mechanisms for extracting surplus from productive 
workers, and our findings suggest that the outcomes for workers from high CNC enforceability 
may be somewhat similar to those due to labor market collusion. Our results suggest that for tech 
workers, particularly high-initial-wage tech workers, variation in CNC enforceability does matter 
23 In his deposition during the Department of Justice investigation into the Silicon Valley 
gentleman’s agreements, George Lucas said “[We] could not get into a bidding war with other 
companies because we don’t have the margins for that sort of thing.” 
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for both mobility and wage outcomes; therefore (potentially undetected) labor market collusion 
in low-enforceability states does not fully replicate the effects of formal CNC enforceability 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there could be variations across sectors in the sustainability of labor 
market collusion (e.g., state-industries with very high concentration), which could provide an 
interesting source of heterogeneity worth further study. 
Finally, our findings suggest a potential impact of CNC enforceability on aggregate 
productivity, which could be explored in future work. In particular, our results suggest that CNC 
enforceability generates a real mobility-lowering friction, not offset by side payments. As 
discussed above, our finding of lower wages in high-enforceability states may suggest poorer 
worker-firm matching, suggesting that CNC enforceability may reduce allocative efficiency in a 
manner similar to other frictions found to impede labor reallocation in e.g., the literature on 
employment protection (Autor, Kerr and Kugler 2007; Petrin and Sivadasan 2013). 
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Table 1. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Mobility 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs). The dependent variables are 
dummy variables for the job spell surviving at 4th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell for columns (1)-(8), and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters 
for column  (9). CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are not right censored by the quarter for 
columns (1)-(8), and all jobs that started its spell in year 2000 or earlier for column (9). All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job spell survival at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr Ln(job-spell) 
                    
Tech X CNC Score -0.0002 0.0033*** 0.0040*** 0.0046*** 0.0051*** 0.0057*** 0.0046*** 0.0052*** 0.0152*** (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0027) 
          
# of observations 12984300 12425700 11971100 11602500 11334900 11127400 10861700 10661700 6492100 
R-squared 0.2108 0.1741 0.1731 0.1768 0.1817 0.1836 0.1831 0.1885 0.2113 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All jobs that are not right censored by the quarter Spell started 2000 or earlier 
 
Table 2. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Wage across Job Tenure 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage across job tenure by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs). The dependent 
variables are the log of quarterly wages at 4th , …, 32nd quarter of the job spell. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. All standard 
errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of wage at xth quarter 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0057*** -0.0066*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** -0.0061*** -0.0054*** -0.0061*** -0.0057*** (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0016) 
         # of observations 10904200 7397200 5399500 4048400 3145300 2478900 1858400 1412600 
R-squared 0.6726 0.6090 0.5764 0.5570 0.5429 0.5323 0.5237 0.5114 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All continuing jobs in the quarter 
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Table 3. Effect of CNC on Mobility: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility across sub-samples by industry (high-tech jobs vs non-tech jobs) and initial 
wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs). High-initial-wage jobs are jobs whose starting wage is above the 98th percentile in the distribution of 
starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. The dependent variables are dummy variables for the job spell surviving at 4th, …, 32nd 
quarter of the job spell for columns (1)-(8), and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters for column  (9). CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC 
enforcement index scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are not right censored by the quarter for columns (1)-(8), and all jobs that started its spell in year 
2000 or earlier for column (9). All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job spell survival at: 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr Ln(job-spell) 
                    
Tech X High-initial-wage 
X CNC Score (β1) 
0.0048*** 0.0099*** 0.0113*** 0.0092*** 0.0094*** 0.0084*** 0.0074*** 0.0060*** 0.0210*** 
(0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0038) 
          
Tech X CNC Score (β2) 
-0.0003 0.0031** 0.0038*** 0.0044*** 0.0049*** 0.0056*** 0.0044*** 0.0051*** 0.0148*** 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0027) 
          
High-initial-wage X 
CNC Score (β3) 
0.0002 -0.0047*** -0.0059** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0036*** -0.0074** 
(0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0032) 
          
# of observations 12984300 12425700 11971100 11602500 11334900 11127400 10861700 10661700 6492100 
R-squared 0.2108 0.1741 0.1732 0.1768 0.1817 0.1836 0.1831 0.1885 0.2113 
          
High vs Low Wage in 
Tech industry (β1+β3) 
0.00506*** 0.00519*** 0.00535*** 0.00479*** 0.00515*** 0.00432*** 0.00343** 0.00245* 0.0136*** 
p value 3.13e-06 1.18e-06 3.73e-08 3.26e-06 0.000248 0.00177 0.0141 0.0797 1.02e-05 
          
Tech vs Non-Tech in 
High-initial-wage jobs 
(β1+β2) 
0.0045*** 0.0129*** 0.0151*** 0.0136*** 0.0143*** 0.0140*** 0.0119*** 0.0111*** 0.0358*** 
p value 3.76e-05 6.75e-10 6.14e-07 9.60e-10 5.07e-11 4.97e-10 7.64e-08 4.89e-07 1.36e-10 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  







Table 4. Effect of CNC on Wage across Job Tenure: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage throughout job tenure, across sub-samples by industry (high-tech jobs vs non-
tech jobs) and initial wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs). High-initial-wage jobs are jobs whose starting wage is above the 98th percentile in 
the distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. The dependent variables are the log of quarterly wages at 4th, …, 32nd 
quarter of the job spell. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log wage at xth quarter 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
                  
Tech X High-initial-
wage X CNC Score (β1) 
-0.0098*** -0.0085** -0.0123*** -0.0130*** -0.0146*** -0.0145*** -0.0159*** -0.0185*** 
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0043) 
         
Tech X CNC Score (β2) 
-0.0055*** -0.0064*** -0.0065*** -0.0066*** -0.0057*** -0.0051*** -0.0057*** -0.0052*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
         
High-initial-wage X 
CNC Score  (β3) 
-0.0215*** -0.0201*** -0.0196*** -0.0213*** -0.0245*** -0.0205** -0.0246*** -0.0308*** 
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0100) 
         
# of observations 10904200 7397200 5399500 4048400 3145300 2478900 1858400 1412600 
R-squared 0.6726 0.6090 0.5764 0.5571 0.5430 0.5324 0.5238 0.5115 
         
High vs Low Wage in 
Tech industry (β1+β3) 
-0.0313*** -0.0286*** -0.0320*** -0.0343*** -0.0390*** -0.0350*** -0.0405*** -0.0493*** 
p value 1.52e-05 0.000279 0.00124 0.00104 7.45e-05 0.000110 5.48e-06 5.37e-07 
         
Tech vs Non-Tech in 
High-initial-wage jobs 
(β1+β2) 
-0.0152*** -0.0149*** -0.0188*** -0.0196*** -0.0203*** -0.0196*** -0.0216*** -0.0237*** 
p value 1.63e-05 0.000592 2.25e-05 2.44e-05 6.00e-06 2.24e-06 7.29e-07 6.16e-05 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table 5. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Cumulative Wage and Wage Growth across Job Tenure 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on cumulative wage and on wage growth from initial wage, across job tenure, by 
industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs). The dependent variables are the log of cumulative wage at 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell for Panel A, and the 
difference between the log of quarterly wages at 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell and the log of initial wage for Panel B. CNC Score is measured as the 
2009 CNC enforcement index scores. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Cumulative Wage 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of cumulative wage at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0060*** -0.0072*** -0.0077*** -0.0079*** -0.0080*** -0.0084*** -0.0081*** -0.0094*** (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
         # of observations 10904000 7397000 5399000 4048000 3145000 2479000 1858000 1413000 
R-squared 0.5902 0.6437 0.6708 0.6838 0.6891 0.6894 0.6887 0.6814 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All continuing jobs in the quarter 
 
Panel B. Wage Growth 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log  of wage at xth quarter 
- Log of initial wage   4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0054*** -0.0063*** -0.0065*** -0.0066*** -0.0057*** -0.0050*** -0.0057*** -0.0056*** (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
         # of observations 10904000 7397000 5399000 4048000 3145000 2479000 1858000 1413000 
R-squared 0.1455 0.1779 0.2047 0.2281 0.2504 0.2721 0.2946 0.3129 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table 6. Effect of CNC on Cumulative Wages and Wage Growth over Job Tenure: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on cumulative wage and on wage growth from initial wage throughout job tenure, across 
sub-samples by industry (high-tech jobs vs non-tech jobs) and initial wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs). High-initial-wage jobs are jobs 
whose starting wage is above the 98th percentile in the distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. The dependent 
variables are the log of cumulative wage at 4th, 12th, 20th, 28th quarter of the job spell for columns (1) ~ (4), and the difference between the log of quarterly wages 
at 4th, 12th, 20th, 28th quarter of the job spell and the log of initial wage for columns (5) ~ (8). CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. 
All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Log of cumulative wage at Log  of wage at xth quarter - Log of initial wage   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 4th quarter 12th quarter 20th quarter 28th quarter 4th quarter 12th quarter 20th quarter 28th quarter 
              
Tech X High-initial-wage 
X CNC Score (β1) 
-0.0112*** -0.0095*** -0.0192*** -0.0182*** -0.0027 -0.0084*** -0.0087** -0.0130** 
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0052) 
         
Tech X CNC Score (β2) 
-0.0057*** -0.0074*** -0.0076*** -0.0077*** -0.0054*** -0.0063*** -0.0055*** -0.0054*** 
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
         
High-initial-wage X CNC 
Score (β3) 
-0.0186*** -0.0224*** -0.0240*** -0.0257*** -0.0136*** -0.0094*** -0.0125*** -0.0122** 
(0.0043) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0047) 
         
# of observations 10904000 5399000 3145000 1858000 10904000 5399000 3145000 1858000 
R-squared 0.5902 0.6709 0.6892 0.6889 0.1455 0.2047 0.2504 0.2947 
         
High vs Low Wage in Tech 
industry (β1+β3) 
-0.0298*** -0.0319*** -0.0432*** -0.0439*** -0.0163*** -0.0178*** -0.0212*** -0.0252*** 
p value 2.13e-05 0.000727 9.91e-05 0.000357 7.73e-06 1.25e-05 2.21e-10 0 
         
Tech vs Non-Tech in High-
initial-wage jobs (β1+β2) 
-0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0268*** -0.0259*** -0.00813*** -0.0146*** -0.0142*** -0.0184*** 
p value 3.52e-07 1.21e-05 3.23e-09 4.75e-07 0.00369 1.80e-05 0.00142 0.00197 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table 7. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Career Outcomes across Employment History 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on cumulative number of jobs taken across workers’ employment history in Panel A, 
and on cumulative earnings across workers’ employment history in Panel B, by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs) of the worker’s first job. The 
dependent variables are the log of cumulative number of jobs taken at 4th, …, 32nd quarter of the workers’ employment history in Panel A, and the log of 
cumulative earnings at 4th , …, 32nd quarter of the workers’ employment history in Panel B. The high-tech job dummy variable is that of the first job of the 
worker. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores of the state in which the first job of the worker is geographically located in. The job-
level fixed effects controls for the job characteristics of the first job of the worker. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Number of Jobs across Employment History 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of cumulative number of jobs at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0085 -0.0121* -0.0142** -0.0136* -0.0156** -0.0185** -0.0197** -0.0215** (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
         # of observations 7517000 6389000 5594000 4973000 4485000 4057000 3671000 3229000 
R-squared 0.3325 0.2892 0.2626 0.2477 0.2368 0.2330 0.2332 0.2352 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All employed workers in the quarter 
 
Panel B. Cumulative Earnings across Employment History  
  Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of cumulative earnings at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0112*** -0.0118*** -0.0123*** -0.0128*** -0.0126*** -0.0125*** -0.0121*** -0.0115*** (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
         # of observations 7517000 6389000 5594000 4973000 4485000 4057000 3671000 3229000 
R-squared 0.6245 0.6121 0.5951 0.5778 0.5603 0.5448 0.5291 0.5143 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table 8. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Switching States or Industries 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on cumulative number of state switches in Panel A, on cumulative number of industry 
switches in Panel B, and on cumulative number of state-but-not-industry switches in Panel C, across workers’ employment history, by industry (high-tech jobs 
vs. non-tech jobs) of the first job. The dependent variables are log (1+cumulative number of state switches) in Panel A, log (1+cumulative number of three-digit 
NAICS code switches) in Panel B, and log (1+cumulative number of state-but-not-industry-switches)  in Panel C, at 4th, …, 32nd   quarter of the workers’ 
employment history. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores of the state in which the first job of the worker is geographically located 
in. The job-level fixed effects controls for the job characteristics of the first job of the worker. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Switch States  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+cumulative # 
of state switch) at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
0.0003* 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013** 
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
R-squared 0.0746 0.0774 0.0855 0.0926 0.0987 0.104 0.1085 0.1138 
Panel B. Switch Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+cumulative # 
of industry switch) at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
-0.0018*** -0.0044*** -0.0067*** -0.0094*** -0.0119*** -0.0135*** -0.0162*** -0.0186*** 
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) 
R-squared 0.1305 0.1394 0.1502 0.158 0.1633 0.1674 0.1722 0.1749 
Panel C. Switch State but not Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+cumulative # 
of state switch without industry switch) 
at 
4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 
(0) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
R-squared 0.043 0.0525 0.0611 0.0685 0.074 0.0779 0.0814 0.0858 
# of observations 7517000 6389000 5594000 4973000 4485000 4057000 3671000 3229000 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  




We model wage setting and employment choice (stay or move to another firm) for an incumbent worker. 
The relationship value (or additional firm value) generated by the worker is 𝜃𝜃. At the beginning of the 
period the worker gets a single wage draw (𝑊𝑊0) from a uniform [0,  1 + 𝜇𝜇] distribution. 
Worker’s decision rule is as follows:24 
• If 𝑊𝑊0 > 𝜃𝜃:  Exit the firm and take outside offer 
• If 𝑊𝑊0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃:  Negotiate with the firm 
 
The negotiated wage if the worker stays in the firm is given by: W (if stay) = 𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃 +  (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(Outside option) = 𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(W0)  
where 𝛼𝛼 reflects bargaining power of the workers, so that when 𝛼𝛼 = 1, the workers get paid the full value of 
the relationship. (We discuss the effect of noncompete on 𝛼𝛼below.) Then probability of exit is: 
P[Exit]=𝑃𝑃[𝑊𝑊0 > 𝜃𝜃] = 1 − 𝜃𝜃1+𝜇𝜇         (1) 
Expected wages (which correspond to our regressions estimates, assuming independent distributions and 
wage draws over time and across workers) are given by:25 
E[W|Stay] = E[W|W0 < θ] = 𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(E[W0|W0 < θ) = αθ + (1 − α) 𝜃𝜃2 = (1+𝛼𝛼)𝜃𝜃2    (2) 













2(1+𝜇𝜇)�     (3) 
 












Figure TA1: Expected wages, and probability of exit  
Assumptions about effects of non-compete enforceability:  We make two fairly straightforward assumptions 
about the effects of non-compete enforceability (𝜂𝜂): A1: Increase in enforceability leads to reduction in 
worker bargaining power, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 0, and A2: The upper bound of outside wage distribution is decreasing 
24 To focus on CNC enforceability, our framework abstracts from other drivers of worker turnover including e.g., 
health shocks, spousal career shocks, or learning about match quality. This is innocuous so long as these are 
uncorrelated with degree of noncompete enforceability (or adequately controlled for in our empirical analysis). 
25 In particular, within job spell wage regressions correspond to E[Wage|stay] and worker career regressions 
correspond to the unconditional expected wage E[Wage]. 
P[Exit]=𝑃𝑃[𝑊𝑊0 > 𝜃𝜃] = 1 − 𝜃𝜃1+𝜇𝜇 
𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊0|𝑊𝑊0 < 𝜃𝜃] 
𝜃𝜃2 0 1 + 𝜇𝜇 𝜃𝜃 (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜃𝜃2  
E[W|Stay] 




1 + 𝜇𝜇2 + 𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃22(1 + 𝜇𝜇)� 
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in enforceability, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 0. Assumption A1 is motivated by a widely discussed potential effect of 
noncompete covenants (e.g., Arnow-Richman 2006). Assumption A2 tractably captures two plausible 
effects of noncompete enforceability. First, the firms that can derive the highest value from the worker are 
likely to be close competitors who can exploit all of the worker's knowledge; so reduction in noncompete 
enforceability may induce some of the highest value outside bidders to make an offer. Second, while we 
assume for tractability that the worker seeks out one outside offer, in a more general case the worker may 
get multiple (say N) bids so that the relevant outside option is the maximum of N bids. Increase in 
noncompete enforceability would likely decrease the number of firms willing to bid for the worker, which 
would decrease the expected maximum of the bids.26  
We consider three alternative cases for the determination of the relationship value 𝜃𝜃. 
Case 1:  Exogenous 𝜽𝜽 
In this case, by assumption the relationship-specific value does not vary with degree of noncompete 
enforcement. However, by assumptionsA1 and A2 above, the worker bargaining power and outside wage 
offer range varies leading to the following results: 
Result 1: Probability of exit goes down with increase in noncompete enforcement.  
Result 2a: 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊|Stay] (i.e., average wage conditional on staying in the initial job spell) goes down with 
increase in noncompete enforcement. 
Result 2b: 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊] (i.e., unconditional average wage) goes down with increase in noncompete enforcement. 
Result 1 follows directly from assumption A2, as decrease in 𝜇𝜇 reduces the probability that the outside offer 
will exceed the relationship-specific value (see Equation 1). Similarly, reduction in worker bargaining 
power (assumption A1) leads immediately to Result 2a (see Equation 2). Result 2b, follows from the fact 
that in Equation (3) both E[W|Exit] and E[W|Stay] go down, and weight on the larger (E[W|Exit]) also 
down  up (as P[Exit] goes up). 
Case 2:  Endogenous 𝜽𝜽, firm and individual investments matter for relationship value  
Suppose 𝜃𝜃 is endogenous and determined by firm investments(𝑘𝑘) and individual investments (𝑚𝑚), such that 






Firm and individual investments are made ex-ante, based on expectations. The firm’s optimization problem 
is:  max𝑘𝑘 𝐹𝐹[Π] =   max
𝑘𝑘
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2(1+𝜇𝜇)� 𝜃𝜃2 − 𝑘𝑘� 
The individual’s optimization problem is:   max
𝑚𝑚
𝐹𝐹[Surplus]    =   max
𝑚𝑚
{E[W]) −  m }  





2(1+𝜇𝜇)� − 𝑚𝑚� 
This yields optimal investment choices: 
𝑘𝑘∗ = 1
𝑐𝑐
�a − 2(1+𝜇𝜇)(1−𝛼𝛼) � ;               𝑚𝑚∗ = 1𝑑𝑑 �b − 2(1+𝜇𝜇)𝛼𝛼 �      (3) 
Lemma 1a: Optimal investment (𝑘𝑘∗) is unambiguously increasing in degree of noncompete enforcement (as 
𝜇𝜇 and 𝛼𝛼 both decrease with noncompete enforcement). 







 (or  �𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑






26 This can be seen analytically in the case where the underlying wage distribution is a Gumbel with location and scale 
parameters 𝜙𝜙 and 𝜎𝜎; then expected maximum of N draws = 𝜙𝜙 + 𝜎𝜎 log(N). 
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For firms, the negative effects on both the bargaining and outside options increase investment incentives in 
high enforcement regimes. For individuals, the negative bargaining effect lowers investment incentive in 
high enforcement regimes, but the decrease in outside option increases the incentive to invest to increase 
relationship-specific value, so the net effect of an increase in CNC enforceability on individual investment 
is negative only if the magnitude of enforceability’s effect on bargaining power is strong enough. Hereafter, 







   i.e., �𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑






Solving out for optimal relationship capital yields:  
𝜃𝜃∗  =  �𝑎𝑎2
2𝑐𝑐
 −  2 (1+𝜇𝜇)2
𝑐𝑐(1−𝛼𝛼)2 + 𝑏𝑏22𝑑𝑑 − 2 (1+𝜇𝜇)2𝑑𝑑 𝛼𝛼2 �0.5       (4) 
We now consider two polar cases, to understand differences in outcomes depending on whether firm or 
individual investments matter for relationship-specific value. 
Case 2A:  Only firm investments matter (i.e., b=d=0)  
In equation 4, the third and fourth terms drop out, and we get the following results: 
Result 3: Probability of exit is unambiguously decreasing in CNC enforceability. 
This follows from the facts that optimal investment (Lemma 1a), and hence relationship capital level 𝜃𝜃 
increases with enforceability (in equation 4, 𝜇𝜇 and 𝛼𝛼 decrease with increase in enforceability), and the upper 
bound 𝜇𝜇 drops (by assumption A1).  
Result 4a: Effect of increased enforcement on 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊|Stay] (i.e., average wage conditional on staying in the 
initial job spell) is ambiguous.  
This is because in equation 2, while 𝜃𝜃 increases with CNC enforcement, bargaining power 𝛼𝛼 declines, so 
the net impact on the wages is unclear. Intuitively, the relationship-specific value is enhanced but workers’ 
bargaining power may be lowered so much that they may not get any net benefit. 
Result 4b: Effect of increased enforcement on 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊] (i.e., unconditional average wage) is ambiguous.  
This is because in equation 3, effect on both E[W|Exit] and E[W|stay] is unclear, though weight on larger 
quantity (E[W|Exit]) (i.e., probability of exit) does go down (from Result 3 above).      
Case 2B:  Only individual investments matter (i.e., a=c=0)  
In equation 4 the first and second terms drop out, and we get the following results: 
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� ) then probability of exit declines with enforceability. 
This follows from the facts that while optimal investment (Lemma 1a), and hence relationship capital level 
𝜃𝜃 decreases with enforceability (this is guaranteed by assumption A3, which makes 𝑑𝑑 𝜃𝜃∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 0), the upper 
bound 𝜇𝜇 drops (by assumption A1). Thus the net effect depends on which shift is larger; only if the 
magnitude of the decline in optimal relationship value is small enough relative to magnitude of the decline 
in the upper bound will the probability of exit decline with enforceability.  
Result 6a: 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊|Stay] (i.e., average wage conditional on staying in the initial job spell) decreases with 
increase in enforceability.  
This is because in equation 2, both 𝜃𝜃 and bargaining power 𝛼𝛼 declines with enforceability. Intuitively, 
relationship value and bargaining power being lower means workers are worse off.  
Result 6b: Effect of increased enforceability on 𝐹𝐹[𝑊𝑊] (i.e., unconditional average wage) is ambiguous in 




This is because in equation 3, both E[W|Exit] and E[W|Stay] decrease with enforceability, but weight on 
larger quantity (E[W|Exit]) may increase (if P[Exit) goes up). If P[Exit) goes down (i.e., if shift in upper 
bound 𝜇𝜇 is modest relative to the shift in 𝜃𝜃∗), then then the ambiguity is resolved and E[W] declines with 
enforceability.    
Endogeneity of enforcement choice by the firm 
The above analysis presumes that increase in enforceability results in decline of bargaining power (A1) and 
increase in upper bound of outside offers (A2). In principle however, firms could choose not to include 
CNC clauses even in high-enforceability regimes; this raises the question of whether it would be the case 
that excluding CNC clauses may be beneficial to the firm. The following lemmas address this. 
Lemma 2a: In case 2A (where firm investments matter for relationship-specific value), it is in the firm’s 
interest to fully exploit enforceability, i.e., firm surplus is greater with enforcing (and reducing bargaining 
power (A1) and outside offers (A2)) than without. 
Lemma 2b: In case 2B (where individual investments matter for relationship-specific value), sufficient 
conditions for the firm to fully exploit enforceability are that (i) probability of exit declines in 
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Lemma 2a follows directly from taking a simple derivative of firm’s optimal profit levels with respect to 𝜂𝜂 
and verifying that higher enforcement (𝜂𝜂) in case 2A leads to greater profits. Lemma 2b follows form the 
fact that if probability of exit is lower, and if decline in bargaining power of the worker is steep enough, 
then the firm’s share of the smaller pie (due to reduced worker investment) is larger with enforcement than 
without. 
Note that in an incomplete information environment, A1 and A2 do not depend on formal inclusion of CNC 
clauses in employment contracts. In particular, if there are some firm types for whom Lemma 2a and/or 2b 
holds, and if outside bidders are unsure of the target worker’s employer firm type, A2 would bind as bids 
would be more discouraged as enforceability increases. Similarly, if employees have incomplete 
information on whether CNC clauses are included in the contract (they may often be unaware of clauses in 
the contract e.g. Arnow-Richman 2006) or if they fear these could be introduced, that may be sufficient to 
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Figure A2. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Mobility 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility, of high-tech 








Figure A3. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Wage across Job Tenure 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage, of high-tech jobs 
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Figure A4. Effect of CNC on Mobility of High-Tech Jobs: High-initial-wage Jobs vs Low-initial-wage Jobs  
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility, of high-initial-
wage jobs relative to low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in 
the distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. Mobility is measured as the dummy variable for the spell surviving at 4th, 
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Figure A5. Effect of CNC on Mobility of High-initial-wage Jobs: High-Tech Jobs vs Non-Tech Jobs 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility, of high-tech 
jobs relative to non-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in the 
distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. Mobility is measured as the dummy variable for the spell surviving at 4th, …, 
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Figure A6. Pseudo Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences: Effect of CNC on Mobility of High-Tech Jobs  
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the pseudo difference-in-difference-in-differences treatment effect of CNC 
enforceability on mobility, of high-tech jobs relative to non-tech jobs, after differencing out the common unobservables across high-initial-wage jobs and low-
initial-wage jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in the distribution of starting wages of jobs that 
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Figure A7. Effect of CNC on Wage of High-Tech Jobs: High-initial-wage Jobs vs Low-initial-wage Jobs  
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage, of high-initial-
wage jobs relative to low-initial-wage jobs within high-tech jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in 
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Figure A8. Effect of CNC on Wage of High-initial-wage Jobs: High-Tech Jobs vs Non-Tech Jobs 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage, of high-tech jobs 
relative to non-tech jobs within high-initial-wage jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in the 
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Figure A9. Pseudo Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences: Effect of CNC on Wage of High-Tech Jobs  
This figure plots the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the pseudo difference-in-difference-in-differences treatment effect of CNC 
enforceability on wage, of high-tech jobs relative to non-tech jobs, after differencing out the common unobservables across high-initial-wage jobs and low-
initial-wage jobs. High-initial-wage jobs are defined as jobs with starting wage being above the 98th percentile in the distribution of starting wages of jobs that 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
This table presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables reported. I{4}-I{32} denote indicator variables for the job spell surviving in the 4th-32nd 
quarter since the job spell started. Log(job-spell) denotes the number of quarters the job lasted in logs. Log(wage4)-Log(wage32) denote quarterly wages at the 
4th-32nd quarter since the job spell started. Log(cwage4)-Log(cwage32) denote cumulative wage at the 4th-32nd quarter since the job spell started, in logs. 
dLog(wage4)-dLog(wage32) denote the logged differences in quarterly wage at the 4th-32nd quarter since the job spell started and the initial wage of the job. 
Log(cjobs4)-Log(cjob32) denote cumulative number of jobs taken (in logs) in the 4th-32nd quarter of the worker’s employment history. Log(cwageE4)-
Log(cwageE32) denote the worker’s cumulative earnings (in logs) in the 4th-32nd quarter of the worker’s employment history. Log(State4)-Log(State32) denote 
the cumulative number of switches in states, Log(Ind4)-Log(Ind32) denote the cumulative number of switches in industries, and Log(StNoInd4)-Log(StNoInd32) 
denote the cumulative number of switches in states but not in industries, in the 4th-32nd quarter of the worker’s employment history.  
Variable Mean St.Dev Variable Mean St.Dev Variable Mean St.Dev 
I{4} 0.845 0.362 dLog(wage4) 0.049 0.465 Log(State8) 0.027 0.136 
I{8} 0.583 0.493 dLog(wage8) 0.076 0.520 Log(State12) 0.033 0.154 
I{12} 0.434 0.496 dLog(wage12) 0.101 0.546 Log(State16) 0.040 0.171 
I{16} 0.331 0.471 dLog(wage16) 0.128 0.566 Log(State20) 0.048 0.187 
I{20} 0.261 0.439 dLog(wage20) 0.151 0.582 Log(State24) 0.055 0.202 
I{24} 0.208 0.406 dLog(wage24) 0.169 0.595 Log(State28) 0.062 0.216 
I{28} 0.160 0.367 dLog(wage28) 0.191 0.614 Log(State32) 0.070 0.230 
I{32} 0.124 0.329 dLog(wage32) 0.211 0.632 Log(Ind4) 0.051 0.186 
Log(job-spell) 2.363 0.977 Log(cjobs4) 0.383 0.385 Log(Ind8) 0.106 0.270 
Log(wage4) 9.578 0.777 Log(cjobs8) 0.498 0.435 Log(Ind12) 0.152 0.327 
Log(wage8) 9.636 0.750 Log(cjobs12) 0.600 0.468 Log(Ind16) 0.195 0.371 
Log(wage12) 9.675 0.739 Log(cjobs16) 0.686 0.492 Log(Ind20) 0.234 0.408 
Log(wage16) 9.708 0.735 Log(cjobs20) 0.761 0.512 Log(Ind24) 0.270 0.438 
Log(wage20) 9.740 0.731 Log(cjobs24) 0.825 0.528 Log(Ind28) 0.304 0.464 
Log(wage24) 9.763 0.727 Log(cjobs28) 0.886 0.543 Log(Ind32) 0.340 0.489 
Log(wage28) 9.785 0.731 Log(cjobs32) 0.939 0.557 Log(StNoInd4) 0.002 0.034 
Log(wage32) 9.804 0.733 Log(cwageE4) 10.887 0.682 Log(StNoInd8) 0.005 0.058 
Log(cwage4) 11.003 0.885 Log(cwageE8) 11.631 0.654 Log(StNoInd12) 0.008 0.075 
Log(cwage8) 11.765 0.767 Log(cwageE12) 12.054 0.646 Log(StNoInd16) 0.011 0.089 
Log(cwage12) 12.204 0.714 Log(cwageE16) 12.353 0.642 Log(StNoInd20) 0.014 0.100 
Log(cwage16) 12.514 0.683 Log(cwageE20) 12.586 0.642 Log(StNoInd24) 0.016 0.110 
Log(cwage20) 12.762 0.663 Log(cwageE24) 12.778 0.643 Log(StNoInd28) 0.019 0.119 
Log(cwage24) 12.966 0.649 Log(cwageE28) 12.942 0.645 Log(StNoInd32) 0.021 0.127 
Log(cwage28) 13.137 0.641 Log(cwageE32) 13.083 0.646 





Table A2. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Mobility and Wage: Controlling for Local Labor Market Thickness 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility and wage across job tenure, by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs), after 
controlling for total employment in state-three-digit NAICS code-year (in logs). In Panel A, the dependent variables are dummy variables for the job spell surviving at 4th, 
…, 32nd quarter of the job spell for columns (1)-(8), and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters for column  (9). In Panel B, the dependent variables are the 
log of quarterly wages at 4th , …, 32nd quarter of the job spell. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are 
not right censored by the quarter for columns (1)-(8) of Panel A, and all jobs that started its spell in year 2000 or earlier for column (9) of Panel A, and all continuing jobs 
in the quarter for Panel B. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Mobility 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job spell survival at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr Ln(job-spell) 
                    
Tech X CNC Score -0.0005 0.0029** 0.0037*** 0.0044*** 0.0049*** 0.0056*** 0.0045*** 0.0051*** 0.0146*** (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0028) 
          
Observations 12984300 12425700 11971100 11602500 11334900 11127400 10861700 10661700 6492100 
R-squared 0.2108 0.1742 0.1732 0.1768 0.1817 0.1836 0.1831 0.1885 0.2113 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All jobs that are not right censored by the quarter Spell started 2000 or earlier 
 
Panel B. Wage 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of wage at xth quarter 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Score -0.0057*** -0.0065*** -0.0067*** -0.0068*** -0.0059*** -0.0052*** -0.0058*** -0.0056*** (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
         Observations 10904200 7397200 5399500 4048400 3145300 2478900 1858400 1412600 
R-squared 0.6726 0.6090 0.5764 0.5570 0.5429 0.5323 0.5237 0.5114 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table A3. Effect of CNC on Mobility: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage: State X Industry Fixed Effects 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility across sub-samples by industry (high-tech jobs vs non-tech jobs) and initial 
wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs) (dummy variable for the starting wage of the job being above the 98th percentile in the distribution of 
starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes), with state-industry (2 digit NAICS code) fixed effects. The dependent variables are dummy 
variables for the job spell surviving at 4th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell for columns (1)-(8), and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters for 
column  (9). CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are not right censored by the quarter for 
columns (1)-(8), and all jobs that started its spell in year 2000 or earlier for column (9). All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job spell survival at: 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr Ln(job-spell) 
                    
Tech X High-initial-wage 
X CNC Score (β1) 
0.0050*** 0.0085*** 0.0096*** 0.0078*** 0.0081*** 0.0072*** 0.0064*** 0.0051*** 0.0185*** 
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0037) 
          
Tech X CNC Score (β2) 
-0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0026** 0.0014 0.0021** 0.0072** 
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0032) 
          
High-initial-wage X 
CNC Score (β3) 
-0.0001 -0.0038*** -0.0045*** -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0033*** -0.0028*** -0.0055* 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0030) 
          
# of observations 12984300 12425700 11971100 11602500 11334900 11127400 10861700 10661700 6492100 
R-squared 0.2124 0.1772 0.1769 0.1802 0.1851 0.1867 0.1865 0.1916 0.2162 
          
High vs Low Wage in 
Tech industry (β1+β3) 0.00488*** 0.00464*** 0.00513*** 0.00440*** 0.00481*** 0.00404*** 0.00312** 0.00233 0.0130*** 
p value 6.77e-06 1.93e-06 4.94e-08 8.67e-06 0.000411 0.00368 0.0261 0.101 5.34e-06 
          
Tech vs Non-Tech in 
High-initial-wage jobs 
(β1+β2) 
0.00315** 0.00757*** 0.00884*** 0.00859*** 0.00893*** 0.00986*** 0.00785*** 0.00717*** 0.0257*** 
p value 0.0242 1.27e-05 8.71e-05 3.43e-05 2.59e-06 2.07e-06 0.000601 0.000477 5.67e-08 
Fixed Effects [State-Industry] + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  








Table A4. Effect of CNC on Wage across Job Tenure: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage: State X Industry Fixed 
Effects 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on wage throughout job tenure, across sub-samples by industry (high-tech jobs vs non-
tech jobs) and initial wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs) (dummy variable for the starting wage of the job being above the 98th percentile in 
the distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes), with state-industry (2 digit NAICS code) fixed effects. The dependent 
variables are the log of quarterly wages at 4th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. All standard 
errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log wage at xth quarter 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
                  
Tech X High-initial-wage 
X CNC Score (β1) 
-0.0089*** -0.0077* -0.0121*** -0.0124*** -0.0140*** -0.0138*** -0.0151*** -0.0185*** 
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
         
Tech X CNC Score (β2) 
-0.0041*** -0.0052*** -0.0044*** -0.0047*** -0.0034*** -0.0038*** -0.0044*** -0.0079*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
         
High-initial-wage X CNC 
Score  (β3) 
-0.0225*** -0.0209*** -0.0202*** -0.0224*** -0.0255*** -0.0215*** -0.0259*** -0.0314*** 
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0085) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0100) 
         
# of observations 10904200 7397200 5399500 4048400 3145300 2478900 1858400 1412600 
R-squared 0.6731 0.6096 0.5772 0.5580 0.5442 0.5339 0.5256 0.5135 
         
High vs Low Wage in 
Tech industry (β1+β3) 
-0.0315*** -0.0287*** -0.0323*** -0.0348*** -0.0395*** -0.0353*** -0.0410*** -0.0499*** 
p value 1.42e-05 0.000255 0.00109 0.000833 6.23e-05 0.000107 4.41e-06 4.90e-07 
         
Tech vs Non-Tech in 
High-initial-wage jobs 
(β1+β2) 
-0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0165*** -0.0171*** -0.0174*** -0.0176*** -0.0194*** -0.0264*** 
p value 4.76e-05 0.00193 0.000137 6.84e-05 5.05e-06 2.76e-05 1.02e-06 2.26e-06 
Fixed Effects [State-Industry] + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  






Table A5. Effect of CNC on the Probability of High-Tech Workers’ Switching States or Industries at Job Transition 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on the probability of state switches, industry switches, state switches but not industry switches, 
and industry switches but not state switches at job transition by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs). The dependent variables are dummy variables for switching 
states at job transitions in Panel A, dummy variables for three-digit NAICS code switches at job transitions in Panel B, dummy variables for changes in states, but no 
changes in three-digit NAICS codes at job transitions in Panel C, and dummy variables for changes in three-digit NAICS codes but no changes in states in Panel D, for 
job transitions occurring at any point in time in job tenure for column (1), and for job transitions occurring at 4th, …, 32nd   quarter of job tenure in columns (2) ~ (9). The 
high-tech job dummy is that of the pre-transition job. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores of the state in which the pre-transition job is 
geographically located in. The job-level fixed effects controls for the job characteristics of the pre-transition job. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * 
denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Switch States  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy 
for switching state at  
During job 
tenure 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
0.0106* 0.0087 0.0103* 0.0126** 0.0088 0.012 0.0122 0.0139* 0.005 
(0.0062) (0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0099) 
          
R-squared 0.1194 0.1801 0.2047 0.2615 0.3083 0.3605 0.4086 0.4609 0.5054 
Panel B. Switch Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy 
for switching industry at 
During job 
tenure 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
0.0027 0.0018 0.0006 0.0046 0.0006 0.0062 0.0036 0.0089** -0.0043 
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0033) (0.0061) 
          
R-squared 0.1126 0.203 0.1901 0.242 0.2808 0.3423 0.3833 0.4379 0.4729 
# of observations 12320000 4349000 2983000 1686000 1029000 679000 491000 345000 238000 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex] 






Panel C. Switch State but not 
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for 
switching state but not industry at 
During job 
tenure 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
0.0016*** 0.0014** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0007** 0.0008 
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
          
R-squared 0.0486 0.096 0.1174 0.1603 0.2022 0.2524 0.2872 0.3324 0.3769 
Panel D. Switch Industry but 
not State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for 
switching industry but not state at 
During job 
tenure 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
Tech X CNC Score 
-0.0063* -0.0055 -0.0076** -0.0059 -0.0068* -0.0044 -0.0073** -0.0043 -0.0085** 
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0047) (0.0040) 
          
R-squared 0.0992 0.1692 0.1745 0.2235 0.2732 0.3328 0.3713 0.4223 0.4590 
# of observations 12320000 4349000 2983000 1686000 1029000 679000 491000 345000 238000 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex] 











Table A6. Effect of CNC on High-Tech Workers’ Unemployment Spell 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on the length of unemployment spell by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs). 
Unemployment is defined by the missing spell between two non-continuous job spells. The dependent variable is the log of length of unemployment spells in 
number of quarters. The high-tech job dummy is that of the pre-unemployment job. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores of the 
pre-unemployment job. The job-level fixed effects controls for the job characteristics of the pre-unemployment job. Estimation sample consists of all spells 
between non-continuous job spells. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable Ln(unemployment-spell) 
   
Tech X CNC Score -0.0051 
 (0.0033) 
  
# of observations 4540000 
R-squared 0.1241 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex] 






Table A7. Effect of CNC (in Ranks) on High-Tech Workers’ Mobility and Wage across Job Tenure 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility by industry (high-tech jobs vs. non-tech jobs) in Panel A, and on wage across job 
tenure by industry in Panel B. The dependent variables are dummy variables for the job spell surviving at 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell for column (1) ~ (8) of 
Panel A, and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters for column (9) of Panel A, the log of quarterly wages at 4th, 8th, …, 32nd quarter of the job spell for Panel 
B. CNC Rank is measured as the ranks of the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are not right censored by the quarter for columns 
(1) ~ (8) of Panel A, all jobs that started its spell in year 2000 or earlier for column (9) of Panel A, and all continuing jobs in the quarter for Panel B. All standard errors 
are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Mobility 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job spell survival at 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr Ln(job-spell) 
                    
Tech X CNC Rank 0.0004 0.0052** 0.0065*** 0.0060** 0.0073*** 0.0085*** 0.0064*** 0.0072*** 0.0224*** (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0063) 
          
# of observations 12984300 12425700 11971100 11602500 11334900 11127400 10861700 10661700 6492100 
R-squared 0.2108 0.1741 0.1731 0.1767 0.1817 0.1835 0.1831 0.1884 0.2112 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  
Sample All jobs that are not right censored by the quarter Spell started 2000  or earlier 
 
Panel B. Wage 
 Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of wage at xth quarter 4th qr 8th qr 12th qr 16th qr 20th qr 24th qr 28th qr 32th qr 
         
Tech X CNC Rank -0.0085*** -0.0087*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.0097*** -0.0092*** -0.0103*** -0.0113*** (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0032) 
         # of observations 10904200 7397200 5399500 4048400 3145300 2478900 1858400 1412600 
R-squared 0.6726 0.6089 0.5764 0.5570 0.5429 0.5323 0.5237 0.5114 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  






Table A8. Effect of CNC (in Ranks) on Mobility and Wage across Job Tenure: Sub-Samples by Industry and Initial Wage 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on mobility and wage throughout job tenure, across sub-samples by industry (high-tech 
jobs vs non-tech jobs) and initial wage (high-initial-wage jobs vs low-initial-wage jobs). High–initial-wage jobs are jobs whose starting wage is above the 98th 
percentile in the distribution of starting wages of jobs that have the same three-digit NAICS codes. The dependent variables are dummy variables for the job spell 
surviving at 4th, 12th, 20th, 28th quarter of the job spell for columns (1)-(4), and the log of length of job spells in number of quarters for column  (5), the log of 
quarterly wages at 4th, 12th, 20th, 28th quarter of the job spell for columns (6) ~ (9). CNC Rank is measured as the ranks of the 2009 CNC enforcement index 
scores. Estimation samples are all jobs that are not right censored by the quarter for columns (1) ~ (4), all jobs that started its spell in year 2000 or earlier for 
column (5), and all continuing jobs in the quarter for columns (6) ~ (9). All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Job spell survival at Log of wage at 
 Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 4th qr 12th qr 20th qr 28th qr Ln(job-spell) 4th qr 12th qr 20th qr 28th qr 
Tech X High-initial-wage 
X CNC Rank (β1) 
0.0087*** 0.0210*** 0.0183*** 0.0139*** 0.0425*** -0.0181** -0.0227** -0.0287*** -0.0350*** 
(0.0014) (0.0067) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0074) 
          
Tech X CNC Rank (β2) 
0.0002 0.0061*** 0.0070*** 0.0062** 0.0216*** -0.0081*** -0.0096*** -0.0091*** -0.0095*** 
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0063) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0026) 
          
High-initial-wage X 
CNC Rank (β3) 
0.0014 -0.0118* -0.0086** -0.0073*** -0.0150** -0.0314*** -0.0322*** -0.0431*** -0.0426*** 
(0.0016) (0.0059) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0130) (0.0140) 
          
# of observations 12984300 11971100 11334900 10861700 6492100 10904200 5399500 3145300 1858400 
R-squared 0.2108 0.1732 0.1817 0.1831 0.2112 0.6726 0.5764 0.5430 0.5238 
High vs Low Wage in 
Tech industry (β1+β3) 
0.0100*** 0.0093*** 0.0097*** 0.00658** 0.0274*** -0.0495*** -0.0549*** -0.0717*** -0.0777*** 
p value 6.46e-09 0.000197 0.00157 0.0384 0.000151 0.000925 0.00289 3.76e-06 1.27e-07 
          
Tech vs Non-Tech in 
High-initial-wage jobs 
(β1+β2) 
0.0088*** 0.0271*** 0.0253*** 0.0201*** 0.0640*** -0.0262*** -0.0323*** -0.0377*** -0.0446*** 
p value 4.00e-06 0.000998 9.09e-06 5.00e-05 2.95e-07 0.00288 0.000592 0.000112 1.16e-05 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Wage - Starting Age - Sex]  





Table A9. Effect of CNC on Initial Wage 
This table reports the differential treatment effect of CNC enforceability on initial wage of job, corresponding to Table 2 and Table 4. The dependent variables 
are the log of initial wage (i.e. second quarter wage) of each job. CNC Score is measured as the 2009 CNC enforcement index scores. The fixed effects dummy 
variables do not include the starting wage component for these results. All standard errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  (1)  (2)  
Log of initial wage Corresponding Table: Table 2 Corresponding Table: Table 4 
    
Tech X High-initial-wage X CNC Score (β1)   -0.0775 
   (0.1200) 
    
Tech X CNC Score (δ or β2) 
-0.0259*** -0.0235*** 
(0.0019) (0.0033) 
    
High-initial-wage X CNC Score (β3) 
  -0.2399 
  (0.2965) 
    
# of observations 13205400 13205400 
R-squared 0.1853 0.1919 
     
High vs Low Wage in Tech industry (β1+β3)   -0.317 
p value   0.0876 
     
Tech vs Non-Tech in High-initial-wage jobs (β1+β2)   -0.101 
p value   0.396 
Fixed Effects State + [Industry - Starting Year - Firm Size - Starting Age - Sex] 
Sample All continuing jobs in the quarter 
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